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II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2 (3)(j) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
procedure to consider this appeal from an order of the Third 
Judicial District Court for Summit County, granting the motion of 
plaintiff Furniture Distribution Center ("FDC") for partial summary 
judgment against defendant Ann P. Miles ("Miles"). 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issues presented by this appeal are 
(1) whether the lower court erred in entering summary judgment 
against defendant Miles since there was no genuine issue of 
material fact based upon Miles' failure under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) 
and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration to 
refute plaintiff FDC's sworn facts by proper affidavit; Busch Corp. 
v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co./ 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987); 
(2) whether this Court should review appellant Miles1 
arguments, which are raised for the first time on appeal; Busch 
Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co./ supra; and 
(3) whether, as a matter of law and undisputed fact, FDC was 
entitled by statute and due process to notice by mail or equivalent 
means of the final tax sale of FDC's property and, if so, whether 
Summit County's failure to give FDC such notice invalidated the tax 
sale as a matter of law. See Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams# 
462 U.S. 791 (1983); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306 (1950); Fivas v. Petersen, 5 Utah 2d 280, 300 P.2d 635 
(1956); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351(2) (Supp. 1990). 
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IV. DETERMINATIVE RULES & STATUTES 
Rule 56(c), (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 
4-501(5) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1988) 
(amended 1990) are critical to this appeal. Rule 56(c), (e) 
provides in pertinent part: 
(c) . . . The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depo-
sitions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law . . . . 
(e) . . . When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported [by affidavit] 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Rule 4-501(5) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides 
in part: 
The points and authorities in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin 
with a section that contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall refer with 
particularity to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if 
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence 
or sentences of the movant's facts that are 
disputed. All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement shall be deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing 
parties' statement. 
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The determinative statute, the entire text of which is reproduced 
as an exhibit in Appendix A, is Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351(2) 
(Supp. 1990) (formerly § 59-10-64(1) (1953)). 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS RELEVANT TO APPEAL 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are those set forth in the 
memorandum in support of FDC's motion for partial summary judgment 
and the supporting affidavit of FDC's president, Clarence A. 
Persch. Since Miles did not specifically controvert any of those 
facts in opposition to FDC's motion, this Court must take those 
facts as established under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. Those facts, as set forth in the record below, as 
well as relevant procedural facts, are as follows: 
1. On September 13, 1979, FDC as buyer, entered into a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract ("UREC") with Barry Lynn Burkinshaw 
("Burkinshaw") as seller, for the purchase of the real property 
located in Summit County, known as "Lot 5, Stagecoach Estates, Plat 
'C,'" and more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at a point North 1392.47 feet and 
West 4357.86 feet of the Southeast corner of 
Section 32, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence 
South 45°0' West 1256.38 feet; thence South 
40°30' East 384.71 feet; thence North 44°00' 
East 1202.27 feet; thence North 31°53' West 
372.25 feet to beginning. 
(R. 2-3, 167, 169-70) 
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2. On September 18, 1979, FDC recorded in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder a Notice of Contract regarding the UREC 
(R. 3, 12, 170, 180-81). 
3. Burkinshaw, the seller under the UREC, had acquired the 
property by quitclaim deed from M. Vaughn Bitner ("Bitner") on or 
about November 30, 1978 (R. 170, 211, 213-14). 
4. Bitner and his wife subsequently executed a quitclaim 
deed conveying the subject property to Burkinshaw on or about 
September 13, 1979. That deed was recorded in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder on or about September 18, 1979 (R. 170, 
217) . 
5. FDC made regular payments as required by the UREC until 
the agreed-upon purchase price of $18,550.00, plus interest, was 
paid in full (R. 167, 170). 
6. During the executory period of the UREC, FDC inquired of 
the Summit County Assessor's office as to its liability for payment 
of real property taxes on the subject property. FDC was told in 
response that the title work on the subdivision, of which the 
subject property is a part, had not been completed; consequently, 
the County could not allocate to FDC a portion of the tax liability 
on the entire subdivision or otherwise assess to FDC property taxes 
on the subject property (R. 168, 171). 
1. In fact, Summit County sent tax notices regarding the 
subject property to Bitner (R. 171, 186-87, 195-200). 
8. Real property taxes due on the subject property became 
delinquent for the years 1979 to 1984. Summit County at no time 
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gave FDC notice of any tax delinquency on the subject property by 
mail or by personal service (R. 171, 183-84). 
9. Prior to 1987, FDC had no actual notice of any tax 
delinquency on the subject property (R. 168, 171). 
10. On or about May 3, 1984, Summit County sent to Bitner by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, a notice of final tax 
sale to satisfy delinquent property taxes on the subject property 
(R. 171, 187, 208-09, 218-21). 
11. Summit County did not give FDC notice of the final tax 
sale by mail or by personal service, nor did FDC have actual notice 
of the final tax sale at any time before the sale (R. 168, 172, 
184). 
12. On May 23, 1984, Summit County sold the subject property 
to Bitner at the final tax sale for $637.89. On May 24, 1984, the 
County delivered to Bitner a tax deed to the subject property (R. 
172 184-85, 210). 
13. Bitner subsequently quitclaimed his interest in the 
subject property to Miles (R. 172, 215-16). 
14. Summit County does not claim an interest in the subject 
property. Both Burkinshaw and George H. Marx, to whom Burkinshaw 
assigned his interest in the UREC, have disclaimed any interest in 
the subject property and have offered and tendered to FDC their 
respective interests, if any, in the subject property (R. 172, 222-
23, 231-34, 236).* 
Immediately following page 236 and before page 237 of the 
record is an unnumbered page. Paragraph 8 of that page, which is 
part of George H. Marx's affidavit, also establishes these facts. 
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15. After learning that Bitner and Miles claimed to own the 
subject property pursuant to the tax deed from Summit County, FDC 
notified Bitner and Miles that FDC owned the property and demanded 
that they return the property to FDC. When they failed and refused 
to do so, FDC filed this lawsuit in February 1988 (R. 6, 9). 
16. FDC filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its 
First Cause of Action against all defendants, seeking an order 
declaring the final tax sale, tax deed and all subsequent purported 
conveyances of the subject property invalid and void, and quieting 
title to the property in FDC as against the defendants below and 
all persons claiming under them. FDC's motion was supported by a 
memorandum of points and authorities and the affidavit of FDC's 
president, Clarence A. Persch (R. 164-236). 
17. In response, Bitner and Miles submitted a memorandum of 
points and authorities, but chose not to submit counter-affidavits 
as required under Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(R. 239-43). Bitner and Miles also determined not to controvert 
specifically in their memorandum any of the facts set forth in 
FDC's memorandum to avoid having those facts deemed admitted under 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (compare R. 
169-72 with R. 239-40; see R. 245). Neither Summit County nor any 
of the other defendants resisted FDC's motion. Bitner and Miles 
did not request a hearing on the motion as allowed by Rule 4-501 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (R. 257). 
18. On August 10, 1989, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
district court judge, entered a minute entry ruling granting FDC's 
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motion for partial summary judgment for the reasons set forth in 
FDC's moving and reply papers (R.257). That minute entry ruling 
was incorporated in an order and judgment dated August 24, 1989 (R. 
258-60). Judge Hanson's order and judgment declared the final tax 
sale, Summit County's tax deed to Bitner and all subsequent 
purported conveyances of the subject property invalid and void. 
The order and judgment also quieted title to the property in FDC as 
against the defendants and all persons claiming under them, and 
declared that "Defendants and all persons claiming under Defendants 
have no estate, right, title, lien or interest whatever in or to 
the subject property" (R. 259). 
19. Miles subsequently sought and obtained an order under 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure certifying the 
order and judgment of August 24, 1989 as a final, appealable 
judgment (R. 262-64, 274-76). This appeal, in which Miles alone 
appeals the order and judgment of August 24, 1989, followed. 
Even though the facts recited above are conclusively 
established by Miles' failure to controvert them below, Miles 
attempts to introduce new alleged facts and inferences in her brief 
on appeal. Her attempt to introduce new allegations does not 
create a genuine issue of material fact; accordingly, the Court 
should not even consider those alleged facts. Nevertheless, FDC 
disputes the following alleged facts contained in Miles' statement 
of the case with appropriate citations to the record as to the true 
facts: 
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1. Contrary to Miles1 assertion, there is nothing from 
Summit County in the record to confirm that taxes were assessed on 
the subject property as a separate parcel or that taxes were paid 
as early as 1978 (cf. Miles' brief at 7). 
2. FDC does not dispute Miles' contention that FDC agreed to 
pay future tax assessments (Miles' brief at 7). FDC does, however, 
contend that it was never assessed taxes on the property, and that 
Summit County informed FDC that taxes could not be assessed to the 
property as a single unit (R. 168, 171). 
3. FDC disputes Miles' statement that the title insurance 
policy put FDC on notice that 1979 taxes had been assessed on the 
property as an individual parcel (Miles' brief at 7-8). The title 
insurance policy was never introduced in the record below. 
4. FDC disagrees that the reason Bitner did not pay taxes on 
the property from 1979 through 1983 was that he had quit his 
interest in the property (<cf. Miles' brief at 8). The record does 
not state why Bitner did not pay the taxes even though he continued 
to be assessed for them. Further, the tax assessment notices 
Bitner received specifically state: "If property has been sold, 
please forward to new owner" (R. 197-200). Bitner never did so, 
nor did he otherwise alert FDC that taxes had been assessed (see R. 
168). 
5. Contrary to the suggestion in Miles' brief, Summit County 
did not deny, in response to FDC's motion below, having informed 
FDC that taxes could not be allocated to the property as a single 
unit (Miles' brief at 8). Summit County had previously denied so 
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informing FDC in response to FDCfs requests for admission, but that 
denial was based on the fact that none of several then current 
county officials were aware of such a conversation with FDC (R. 
183, 185). Importantly, Summit County never submitted an affidavit 
to controvert FDCf s sworn statements about the conversation adduced 
in support of FDC's summary judgment motion (nor did Miles or any 
other party), nor did Summit County otherwise resist FDC's motion. 
6. FDC disagrees with Miles' statement that Bitner was the 
owner of record in 1984 when he received by mail the notice of 
final tax sale (Miles1 brief at 8). Even though Bitner continued 
to receive tax assessment notices after conveying the property to 
Burkinshaw, his quitclaim deed to Burkinshaw, as well as FDC's 
Notice of Contract, had already been recorded in September 1979 (R. 
12, 217). 
7. FDC disputes Miles' allegations that she paid taxes on 
the property from 1984 through 1988, and that in reliance on her 
clear title, she placed a dwelling on the property and has made 
other improvements and has been in quiet use and enjoyment of the 
property since 1984 (Miles' brief at 8-9). None of these 
allegations were supported by affidavit in response to FDC's motion 
for partial summary judgment; therefore, they were not considered 
by the court below and may not be properly considered on appeal. 
8. FDC disagrees with Miles statement that Summit County 
indicates that the legal description in FDC's Notice of Contract is 
indefinite (Miles' brief at 9). As set forth on p. 40, infra, the 
legal description in FDC's Notice of Contract is identical to the 
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description in the tax assessment notices, notice of final tax 
sale, and tax deed (R. 182, 195-200, 210, 220). Further, Summit 
County did not oppose FDC's motion for partial summary judgment, 
nor has it appealed the order granting FDC's motion. With respect 
to this and the other disputed facts noted above, Miles cannot 
create on appeal genuine factual issues by relying on allegations 
that were never properly submitted in response to FDC's motion 
below. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Miles' brief is an impermissible attempt to reargue the motion 
she lost below based on new factual allegations unsupported by the 
record and legal arguments that she failed or chose not to raise at 
any time in the summary judgment proceedings below. Since these 
new factual allegations and legal theories could not in any way 
have formed the basis of the lower court's decision, Miles 
improperly attacks that decision as erroneous. The uncontroverted 
facts conclusively establish that FDC is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law; therefore, the lower court's judgment in favor of 
FDC must be affirmed. 
Even though Miles' brief is filled almost entirely with new 
factual allegations and legal arguments that should not be 
considered on appeal, those arguments additionally lack merit and 
in no way require reversal of the lower court's judgment. The 
fundamental flaw in Miles' arguments is that she fails to recognize 
that the requirements for a valid final tax sale, which involves a 
permanent "taking" of real property, are different from the 
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requirements for annual assessment of real property taxes. A valid 
final tax sale requires that every recorded interest holder whose 
identity is reasonably ascertainable receive notice of the sale by 
mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice. Notice by 
mail to interest holders of record is required by the tax sale 
statutes, which are strictly construed in favor of the tax debtor. 
Such notice is also a constitutional requirement, as declared by a 
long line of United States Supreme Court cases. 
By recording its Notice of Contract, FDC became legally 
entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise FDC of the 
final tax sale and afford FDC an opportunity to bid at the sale. 
It is undisputed that FDC never received such notice, and that it 
did not learn that its property had been sold until some three 
years after the sale. FDC was thus deprived of its property rights 
in violation of the tax sale statutes and without due process of 
law. The lower court's judgment declaring the tax sale void as a 
matter of law should therefore be affirmed. 
Further, Miles' arguments that FDC did not do enough to 
entitle it to notice by mail and that, in any case, FDC should have 
been aware that a tax sale would eventually be held are incorrect 
and irrelevant. First, FDC's recorded interest in the property was 
sufficient to entitle FDC to notice by mail or personal service. 
Second, as a matter of undisputed fact, FDC was not aware that 
taxes had been assessed individually on its property, which was 
still part of a subdivision yet to be recorded. And the 
controlling United States Supreme Court authority holds that even 
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if a sophisticated interest holder of record could otherwise 
ascertain that property taxes are delinquent, the government must 
still send the recorded interest holder notice of the final tax 
sale by mail or equivalent means. 
In addition, Miles1 purported predecessor in title, defendant 
Bitner, was not a bona fide purchaser at the tax sale. He 
continued to receive tax assessment notices and received a notice 
of the final tax sale after he had conveyed the property away. 
Rather than notifying Summit County or his grantee of this error, 
he simply waited until the property came up for tax sale and 
purchased it for a fraction of its fair market value. Fairness 
favors FDC, which had faithfully made payments under its uniform 
real estate contract, but which, through a no fault of its own, did 
not receive notice of the tax sale until long after the sale had 
occurred. 
The lower court correctly granted FDC's motion for partial 
summary judgment since there are no genuine issues of material 
fact. Miles failed to controvert any of the material facts set 
forth in the memorandum and affidavit FDC submitted to the court 
below. Since as a matter of undisputed fact FDC did not receive 
notice of the tax sale by mail or its equivalent, the lower court 
correctly decided, as a legal matter, that the notice of the tax 
sale was constitutionally inadequate. The lower court, therefore, 
was correct in declaring the tax sale invalid, and its judgment 
should be affirmed. 
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VII. ARGUMENT 
A. The Lower Court's Order Granting Summary 
Judgment Should Be Affirmed Because There 
Is No Genuine Issue as to Any Material 
Fact and Plaintiff FDC Is Entitled to 
Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the standard of review to 
be utilized in considering appeals from orders granting summary 
judgments: 
A grant of summary judgment is appro-
priate only when no genuine issues of material 
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In determining 
whether the trial court properly found that 
there was no genuine issue of fact, we view 
the facts and inferences therefrom in a light 
most favorable to the losing party. And in 
deciding whether the trial court properly 
granted judgment as a matter of law to the 
prevailing party, we give no deference to the 
trial court's view of the law; we review it 
for correctness. 
Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. UP&L Co., 776 P.2d 632, 
634 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). Applying this standard of 
review to the facts of this case, this Court should affirm the 
lower court's order granting summary judgment. There is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact based upon appellant Miles' failure 
below to contest the facts FDC asserted in support of its motion, 
and FDC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
1. Summary Judgment Was Properly Entered Since 
There Is No Genuine Issue as to Any Material 
Fact. 
In the proceedings below, Miles failed or chose not to comply 
with Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration in contesting facts 
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offered by FDC in support of its motion for summary judgment. 
Thus, in considering on appeal whether any genuine issue of 
material fact exists, this Court should only consider the statement 
of facts contained in the memorandum in support of FDC's motion for 
summary judgment. As this Court stated in Busch Corp. v. State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987): 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides in part: 
Further, when a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
The language of this rule is clear. 
Indeed, we have previously held: 
[W]hen a party opposes a properly 
supported motion for summary 
judgment and fails to file any 
responsive affidavits or other 
evidentiary materials allowed by 
Rule 56(e), the trial court may 
properly conclude that there are no 
genuine issues of fact unless the 
face of the movant's affidavit 
affirmatively discloses the 
existence of such an issue. Without 
such a showing, the Court need only 
decide whether, on the basis of the 
applicable law, the moving party is 
entitled to judgment. 
Id. at 1219 (quoting Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development 
Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983)); accord, Insley 
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Manufacturing Corp, v. Draper Bank and Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 
(Utah 1986) . 
Accordingly, ff[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is filed 
and supported by an affidavit, the party opposing the motion has an 
affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or the materials 
allowed by Rule 56(e)." DNL Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 
(Utah 1989). A party is not permitted to rely on allegations in 
its pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment and Miles' 
failure to submit an affidavit below precludes her from claiming on 
appeal that genuine issues of material fact exist. 
Applying these principles of law to the facts of this case 
demonstrates the correctness of the lower court's decision. In 
support of its motion for summary judgment, FDC submitted the 
uncontroverted affidavit of its president, Clarence A. Persch, 
evidencing the following facts: FDC executed a uniform real estate 
contract for the purchase of the subject property on September 13, 
1979. FDC recorded its Notice of Contract in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder on September 18, 1979 (R. 167, 169-70). FDC 
made regular payments under the contract until the purchase price 
of $18,550 was paid in full (R. 167, 170). Even though FDC had not 
received a tax assessment notice on the property, FDC dutifully 
contacted the Summit County Assessor's office to inquire about 
assessment and payment of property taxes. In response, Summit 
County personnel informed FDC that FDC could not pay taxes on its 
individual parcel because the subdivision of which the property is 
a part had not been completed and filed. Summit County therefore 
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could not allocate a portion of the total tax liability on the 
entire subdivision to FDC's property as a single unit (R. 168, 
171). FDC never received notice of tax assessments on the 
property. In spite of its recorded interest, FDC never received 
notice by mail, personal service or otherwise of the final tax sale 
of the property as required by statute and the United States 
Constitution (R. 168, 171-72, 184). As discussed below, this 
defect in notice given of the tax sale rendered the tax sale 
invalid as a matter of law. 
Since Miles chose not to file any affidavits to controvert any 
of these factual averments, the trial court could properly 
disregard the unsupported statements in Miles1 memorandum in 
opposition to FDC's motion. For the same reason, this Court should 
conclude that there were no genuine issues of fact presented in the 
proceedings below. See Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co., supra, 743 P.2d at 1219. 
In addition to failing to submit affidavits in response to the 
affidavit that FDC submitted in support of its summary judgment 
motion, Miles also chose not to comply with Rule 4-501 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration in her opposition to FDC's motion. 
Rule 4-501(5) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
(1988) provides: 
The points and authorities in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin 
with a section that contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall refer with 
particularity to those portions of the record 
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upon which the opposing party relies, and, if 
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence 
or sentences of the movant's facts that are 
disputed. All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement shall be deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing 
parties' statement. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Under this rule, the facts set forth in the statement of facts 
contained in the memorandum supporting FDC's motion are 
conclusively established because Miles chose not to controvert them 
specifically in her opposing memorandum. Accordingly, Miles should 
not be allowed on appeal to alter the statement of those facts, 
which establish FDC's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. 
2. The Court Should Summarily Dismiss 
Appellant Miles' New Arguments On 
Appeal and Affirm the Lower Court's 
Judgment 
Miles' arguments on appeal were not raised below and thus 
should not be considered by this Court in determining whether the 
lower court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of FDC. As 
this Court has repeatedly stated in cases involving appeals from 
the entry of summary judgment: 
[W]hen an argument has not been made in the 
trial court, we will not allow it to be raised 
on appeal. 
For a question to be considered on 
appeal, the record must clearly show 
that it was timely presented to the 
trial court in a manner sufficient 
This rule is substantially identical to Rule 4-501(2) (b) of 
the Code of Judicial Administration, amended effective January 15, 
1990. 
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to obtain a ruling thereon; we 
cannot merely assume that it was 
properly raised. The burden is on 
the parties to make certain that the 
record they compile will adequately 
preserve their arguments for review 
in the event of an appeal. 
Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co./ supra/ 743 P.2d at 
1219 (citing Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank and Trust/ 
supra7 717 P.2d at 1347; and quoting Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Co./ supra, 659 P.2d at 1045). Thus, "[i]t is 
axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties in the 
trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal." 
Banqerter v. Poulton/ 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) (citations 
omitted). 
The lower court considered FDC's arguments that the notice of 
final tax sale was statutorily and constitutionally defective and 
that FDC was entitled as a matter of law to an order declaring the 
tax sale void. Miles chose to respond to those arguments merely by 
raising two equitable arguments. She did not raise any of her 
arguments on appeal, including her arguments concerning the 
interpretation of Utah statutes governing tax sale notices and the 
constitutional adequacy of notice to FDC, until this appeal. Under 
the authorities cited above, Miles' arguments on appeal should not 
be considered and the lower court's judgment should be summarily 
affirmed. See Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 
supra, 743 P.2d at 1219. 
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B. The Lower Court's Judgment Should be Af-
firmed Because FDC, An Interest Holder of 
Record/ Did Not Receive Notice of the Tax 
Sale as Required By Utah Statutes, and the 
Sale was Consequently Invalid, 
Miles1 first argument on appeal was never raised in the 
proceedings below, and therefore should be dismissed summarily as 
falling outside the scope of this Court's review. In addition, her 
argument lacks merit. 
Miles contends that the lower court erred in interpreting the 
Utah statutes governing the notice requirements for a tax sale. 
Miles also baldly asserts that FDC did not take sufficient steps to 
assure that it would be assessed taxes on the subject property, 
claiming that FDC was not entitled to notice of the tax sale 
because it had not been assessed taxes. 
Miles' argument is fundamentally flawed for two principal 
reasons. First, there is no indication that the lower court 
interpreted any of the statutes cited by Miles in arriving at its 
conclusion that the tax sale was invalid (See R. 257-60). Miles 
did not rely on any of those statues in the proceedings below; she 
should not be allowed to raise the issue of statutory 
interpretation for the first time on appeal. Second, Miles' 
position unreasonably limits the persons entitled to notice of a 
final tax sale to those who have already received notice that taxes 
are delinquent.3 As set forth below, Miles has erroneously failed 
As applied to the facts of this case, Miles' reasoning is 
circular: if FDC had received notice of any tax assessment, FDC 
would have paid the taxes assessed and there would not have been a 
tax sale. The uncontroverted affidavit of Clarence A. Persch 
establishes that FDC attempted unsuccessfully to pay any taxes 
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to differentiate between entitlement to notice of tax assessment 
and entitlement to notice of final tax sale. As a matter of law, 
FDC was entitled to notice of the final tax sale under Utah 
statutes. 
1. Statutes Governing Tax Sales Are 
Strictly Construed In Favor of 
The Taxpayer. 
This Court has consistently applied the rule of strictissimi 
juris to tax sale procedures. See, e.g., Salt Lake Home Builders, 
Inc. v. Colman, 518 P.2d 165 (Utah 1974); Page v. McAfee, 26 Utah 
2d 208, 487 P.2d 861 (1971); Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. 
Ercanbrack, 93 Utah 561, 74 P.2d 1184 (1938). In order for a tax 
sale to be valid to convey title, the statutes governing the sale 
must be strictly followed. For example, in Salt Lake Home 
Builders, Inc. v. Colman and Page v. McAfee, supra, this Court 
overturned tax sales that were conducted by employees of county 
auditors because the employees had not been duly deputized. 
The Salt Lake Home Builders Court declared: 
[T]he main purpose of all of the taxing 
procedures is to enforce the payment of taxes, 
and not the confiscation of property. 
Although it is true that confiscation may be 
the final and drastic measure, it should 
result only as the ultimate necessity to the 
accomplishment of the main objective. It is 
evident that that is the intent of our 
statutes; and consistent therewith it is also 
the practically universal rule of decisional 
owing on the property (R. 168). It strains credulity to conclude 
that FDC would have allowed the property to be sold for some six 
hundred dollars ($600.00) in back taxes at about the same time it 
was paying nearly twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) to purchase 
the property. 
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law: that the sovereign (taxing authority) is 
required to follow procedures prescribed by 
law with accuracy and particularity before it 
can forfeit one's property. 
518 P.2d at the 168 (footnote omitted). 
In Fivas v. Peterson, 5 Utah 2d 280, 300 P.2d 635 (1956), this 
Court addressed a flaw in a tax sale procedure that was even more 
serious than the defect in the Salt Lake Home Builders and Page 
cases cited above. In Fivas, the Court reversed a judgment 
quieting title in purchasers of property at a tax sale as against 
the previous owners who had failed to pay taxes on the property 
because the previous owners had never received notice of tax 
assessments or of the final tax sale. The purchasers contended 
that an amendment to the tax notice statutes had shifted the burden 
to taxpayers to ascertain and pay taxes when due, whether they 
received notice of assessment or not. In response, the Court 
stated: 
In considering the above contention, it 
is necessary to keep in mind the fundamental 
principles which have been established since 
time immemorial underlying adjudications on 
tax titles. The forfeiture of one's property 
for the nonpayment of taxes has always been 
regarded as a harsh procedure, which may work 
great hardships on property owners. An 
awareness of this fact invariably pervades the 
decisions in such cases, with the result that, 
in the interpretation and application of 
statutory requirements antecedent to 
forfeiture of property, they are construed in 
favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing 
authority, and are strictissimi juris. These 
rules are basic to taxation law. 
Id., 300 P.2d at 637 (footnotes omitted); see Fredricksen v. 
LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827, 828 (Utah 1981). 
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The consistent decisions of this Court make it clear that 
statutes governing tax sales, which operate as a forfeiture of the 
taxpayer's property, must be construed narrowly and in favor of the 
tax debtor. 
2. Utah Statutes Require that Notice 
of Final Tax Sales Be Sent to All 
Interest Holders of Record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351 (Supp. 1990) sets forth the 
procedural requirements for final tax sales. Subsection 2 of that 
section, which is substantially the same as its predecessor statute 
in effect at the time of the tax sale in 1984, provides for the 
giving of notice of final tax sale: 
(2) Notice of final tax sale shall be 
published four times in a newspaper published 
and having general circulation in the county, 
once in each of four successive weeks 
immediately preceding the date of sale. If no 
newspaper is published in the county, the 
notice shall be posted in five public places 
in the county, as determined by the auditor, 
at least 25 but no more than 30 days prior to 
the date of sale. Notice of sale shall also 
be sent by certified mail to the last known 
recorded owner and all other recorded 
lienholders, according to the deed, as of the 
preceding March 31, at their last-known 
address. In the case of the sale of the total 
parcel of property, unrecorded or unnotified 
lienholders may assert their liens against 
unclaimed property to the extent that money is 
available to satisfy the liens. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The obvious purpose of this statute is to apprise all interest 
holders of record that the property will be sold to satisfy 
delinquent taxes. 
22 
In its earlier form in effect at the time of the tax sale, 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-64(1) (1953), this statute required that 
notice be sent by mail only to the last known recorded owner. The 
amendment does not broaden the statute's original purpose, to give 
notice of the tax sale to interested parties of record, as declared 
by long-standing decisions of this Court. See Fivas v. Petersen, 
supra, 300 P.2d at 639; Olsen v. Baqley, 10 Utah 492, 37 P.734 
(1894). Rather, the amendment merely attempts to codify the 
constitutionally mandated requirements for notice. See Mennonite 
Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983); Mullane v. Hanover 
Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).4 
In Fivas v. Petersen, supra, the Court emphasized the 
importance of giving statutory notice: 
So far as the taxpayer is concerned, the 
giving of notice is the most critical aspect 
of the procedure which looks toward the 
forfeiture of his property. An elemental 
requisite of deprivation of one of his 
property by process of law is notice in some 
manner. 
Further, FDC was the recorded equitable owner of the 
property at the time of the final sale. Bitner, who received 
notice by mail of the tax sale, certainly was not the owner of 
record because his quitclaim deed to Burkinshaw and Burkinshaw's 
contract with FDC were recorded long before the sale. If Summit 
County had even sent notice by mail to Burkinshaw, FDC may have 
been apprised of the sale because FDC was in privity with 
Burkinshaw, the seller under the UREC. Cf. Mennonite Board of 
Missions v. Adams, supra, 462 U.S. at 799 (notice to party not in 
privity with interested party was insufficient). It is undisputed 
that Summit County failed to comply strictly with the statute in 
either form because it sent notice of the final tax sale to the 
wrong person. That defect renders the tax sale invalid as a matter 
of law. 
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Id., 300 P.2d at 639. The Court went on to hold that the county's 
failure to meet the statutory notice requirement invalidated the 
final tax sale. See also Olsen v. Baqley, 10 Utah 492, 37 P. 739 
(1894) (failure to give statutory notice is not a mere irregu-
larity, but a jurisdictional defect). 
Here, Summit county failed to comply strictly with the 
statutory tax sale procedure in that it failed to send notice of 
the tax sale by certified mail to FDC, the recorded equitable owner 
of the property. In light of the authorities cited above, the 
lower court was therefore correct in determining that the tax sale 
was invalid. 
3. As a Matter of Undisputed Fact, FDC Met the 
Statutory Requirements for Entitlement to 
Notice of the Final Tax Sale. 
As set forth above, FDC recorded its interest in the subject 
property with the Summit County Recorder on September 18, 1879. 
That is all FDC was required to do in order to be entitled to 
notice that the property would be sold to satisfy delinquent taxes. 
For the first time on appeal, Miles contends that FDC should 
have filed a formal request with the Summit County Assessor to 
receive tax assessment notices. Since FDC did not do so, she 
reasons, it was not entitled to notice that its recorded interest 
would be extinguished in the eventual tax sale of the property. 
Miles' position not only ignores the statutory requirement for 
receiving notice, see Fivas v. Petersen, supra, 300 P.2d at 637 
(tax notice statutes do not shift the burden to the taxpayer to 
ascertain and pay taxes when due regardless of whether notice is 
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mailed to the taxpayer), with which FDC complied, but it also 
impermissibly disregards the uncontroverted facts contained in the 
record below. 
The record is clear that in addition to recording its 
interest, FDC sought to pay property taxes even though it had not 
received an assessment notice from the County, and contacted the 
Summit County Assessor's office to do so. In response to FDC's 
inquiries, Summit County erroneously informed FDC that FDC could 
not pay the taxes because taxes were not allocable to the property 
as an individual unit (R. 168, 171).5 Miles now contends that FDC 
should not have relied on this information, and should have done 
much more. In essence, Miles is saying that FDC should have 
second-guessed the constituted governmental authority responsible 
for assessing and collecting taxes on the property, and that FDCfs 
failure to do so somehow nullified its statutory entitlement to 
notice of the tax sale. That contention is patently absurd. 
FDC cannot be faulted for relying on misinformation it 
received from Summit County. Importantly, Summit County did not 
resist FDC's motion for partial summary judgment in the proceedings 
below, and none of the other parties below controverted FDC's 
Miles did not attempt to controvert these facts, which were 
set forth in a sworn affidavit, in the proceedings below. In 
response to a request for admission, Summit County initially denied 
the conversations referred to for lack of information (R. 183, 
185). But it subsequently determined not to refute FDC's affidavit 
or otherwise oppose FDC's motion for partial summary judgment. 
Since Miles did not file any counter-affidavits below, the Court 
should summarily dismiss her present attempt to bootstrap a factual 
issue into existence by relying on Summit County's initial defense 
of this lawsuit. 
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averments regarding its good faith attempts to pay taxes on the 
property. 
In light of the undisputed facts, FDC was entitled to 
statutory notice of the final tax sale, and it did not lose that 
entitlement by purportedly failing to take all of the steps 
necessary to receive notice of previous tax assessments• See Fivas 
v, Petersen, supra. 
4. Miles Improperly Confuses the Notice 
of Tax Assessment With the Notice of 
Final Tax Sale, Which Must be Sent to 
All Recorded Interest Holders, 
Miles contends that only those who are entitled to notice of 
property tax assessment (who, she asserts, are exclusively legal 
title holders and persons formally requesting such notice) are 
entitled to notice of the final tax sale. Miles reasons that since 
FDC did not hold legal title to the property, Utah statutes did not 
allow it to receive notice of the final tax sale unless it had made 
a formal request to the Summit County Assessor for notice of tax 
assessments. In support of this argument, Miles cites several 
statutes regarding the respective duties of the county recorder, 
county assessor and county treasurer. 
Miles' argument lacks merit in that it fails to recognize the 
fundamental distinction between notice of tax assessment and notice 
that the property will be sold to satisfy delinquent taxes. The 
former does not require publication because only those who are 
legally responsible to pay the taxes need to be advised that they 
are due. See Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 977 (Utah 1982) 
(payment of property taxes is a personal obligation of the one 
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assessed). The latter requires publication as well as notice by 
mail to all recorded lienholders to give all interested parties an 
opportunity to protect their interests in the property from the 
harsh results of forfeiture. See Fivas v. Peterson, supra; Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-1351(2) (Supp. 1990). 
Further, the statutes Miles cites with respect to the duties 
of various county officials all pertain to the assessment of taxes, 
not the sale of property to satisfy delinquent taxes. Miles' 
reliance on those statutes is therefore misplaced. 
Miles also relies on Fivas v. Petersen, supra, to excuse 
county assessors for looking only to the information they receive 
from county recorders in determining to whom they will send tax 
assessment notices. The conclusion Miles draws from Fivas ignores 
the holding of that case, that the tax sale was invalid because the 
county failed to take adequate steps to send notice to the 
taxpayer, whose interest was of record. 300 P.2d at 638-40. 
Moreover, the Court said that if the county recorder, assessor and 
treasurer collectively fail to perform their duties, their failure 
is chargeable to the county itself, ^d, at 637. Consequently, it 
is immaterial that FDC recorded its interest with the Summit County 
Recorder rather than filing a formal request for tax assessment 
notices with the Summit County Assessor. The county as a whole had 
a duty to send notice of the final tax sale to FDC because of FDC's 
recorded interest in the property. 
Miles has improperly confused the notice requirements for tax 
assessments with the notice requirements for final tax sales. The 
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statutes and cases upon which Miles relies are inapposite because 
the only relevant issue is whether FDC should have received, and 
did receive, notice of the final tax sale, not whether FDC was 
entitled to annual notice of tax assessments. 
C. The Lower Court's Judgment Declaring the Final 
Tax Sale Void Should Be Affirmed Because FDC 
Did Not Receive Adequate Notice of the Sale as 
Required by Due Process. 
Miles second argument, that FDC received constitutionally 
adequate notice of the final tax sale of the subject property, 
should be dismissed summarily for being raised for the first time 
on appeal.6 In addition, the argument is without merit and ignores 
established case law setting forth the due process requirements for 
adequate notice. 
1. Relevant United States Supreme Court 
Decisions Mandate That Notice By Mail 
or Equivalent Means Be Given to All 
Reasonably Ascertainable Interested 
Parties. 
Miles claims that notice by publication in a newspaper 
circulated solely in Summit County, as well as notice by certified 
mail to Bitner, the purported owner of record, constituted 
sufficient notice to FDC for purposes of due process (see Miles1 
brief at 16-17). That contention flies in the face of numerous 
United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Due Process 
To bolster her argument, Miles relies on a document 
(Exhibit "A" attached to Miles' brief) that was never made part of 
the record below. As explained in footnote 8, infra, that 
document, a title insurance policy issued to FDC with respect to 
the property, has no bearing on whether FDC received adequate 
notice of the tax sale. Nevertheless, since the document was never 
considered by the lower court, this Court should decline to include 
it in the Court's review of the lower court's decision. 
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Clause in relation to notice requirements before a constitutional 
"taking." See, e.g., Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 
U.S. 791 (1983); Schroeder v. New York City, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); 
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
Miles cites two of these cases, Mennonite Board of Missions 
and Mullane, but attempts to distinguish them factually. Miles' 
attempted distinctions do not diminish the force of the paramount 
principles enunciated in those decisions and, in fact, those 
principles have direct application to the facts of this case. 
In Mullane, the seminal decision on the notice requirements of 
due process, the Court struck down a New York banking law governing 
judicial settlement of accounts with respect to a common trust 
fund. Pursuant to that law, the trustee notified beneficiaries of 
the judicial proceeding, which potentially could have cut off the 
beneficiaries' rights against the trustee for mismanagement, only 
by publication in a local newspaper. 339 U.S. at 309-11. The 
Court held that such notice was insufficient for due process 
purposes where the names and addresses of the beneficiaries were 
known. Id. at 319-20. 
The Court defined constitutionally adequate notice of a 
proceeding affecting property interests as "notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections." Jd. at 314 (citations 
omitted). Newspaper publication alone is insufficient: 
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It would be idle to pretend that 
publication alone as prescribed here, is a 
reliable means of acquainting interested 
parties of the fact that their rights are 
before the courts. . . . Chance alone brings 
to the attention of even a local resident an 
advertisement in small type inserted in the 
back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his 
home outside the area of the newspaper's 
normal circulation the odds that the 
information will never reach him are large 
indeed. 
Id. at 315. 
The constitutional principles expressed in Mullane have direct 
application here. The tax sale in May 1984 operated to deprive FDC 
of its equitable interest in the subject property, for which it had 
paid some twenty thousand dollars. See Bill Nay & Sons Excavating 
v. Neeley Construction, Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1984) 
(purchaser under a real estate contract has an equitable interest 
in the property); £f. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, supra, 
462 U.S. at 798 (mortgagee has a legally protected interest, and is 
entitled to notice of a pending tax sale). FDC was an identifiable 
interested party because its name and address appeared on the face 
of the Notice of Contract recorded in the office of the Summit 
County Recorder. Notice by publication in a Summit County 
newspaper was not reasonably calculated to apprise FDC, a resident 
of Salt Lake County, of the pendency of the tax sale; in fact, FDC 
had no notice of the tax sale until more than three years after it 
was held. Under Mullane and its progeny, the notice of the tax 
sale was constitutionally insufficient. Consequently, the tax sale 
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was invalid, and the lower court's decision so holding should be 
affirmed. 
Further, Miles' attempt to distinguish Mullane fails. In 
dictum, the Mullane Court said that "publication traditionally has 
been accepted as notification supplemental to other action which in 
itself may reasonably be expected to convey a warning." Jd. at 
316. When a governmental entity seizes or enters upon tangible 
property, that action "may reasonably be expected to come promptly 
to the owner's attention, . . . [and] publication or posting 
affords an additional measure of notification." Id. Here their 
was no noticeable "direct attack" on FDC's property interest; 
Summit County did not physically enter upon the property or post 
notification on it. It was therefore highly improbable that FDC 
would be apprised of the pending tax sale by publication alone. In 
addition, the Court's subsequent decision in Mennonite Board of 
Missions makes no distinction between interests in tangible and 
intangible property. 
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, supra, the United 
States Supreme Court followed Mullane in reversing a judgment that 
Miles also contends that notice by certified mail to 
Bitner, "the owner of record," satisfied due process requirements 
(see Miles brief at 16-17). It would be naive to assume that 
Bitner, who received notice of tax assessments for five years after 
he had conveyed the property to Burkinshaw, and who eventually 
repurchased the property at the tax sale for a fraction of its 
value, would inform FDC of the pending tax sale. Therefore, the 
notice by mail to Bitner was not reasonably calculated to reach FDC 
as required by due process. Cf. Mennonite Board of Missions v. 
Adams, supra, 462 U.S. at 799 (notice to property owner, who is not 
in privity with his creditor, cannot be expected to lead to notice 
to mortgagee). 
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had upheld the Indiana tax sale statute against the challenge of a 
mortgagee of record that had not received notice of the tax sale of 
the mortgaged property. Pursuant to the Indiana statute, the owner 
of record received notice of the tax sale by certified mail, but 
the only other notice given was by publication in a local newspaper 
and posting in the county courthouse. The mortgagee, whose 
interests were extinguished by the tax sale, did not receive actual 
notice of the sale until long after it took place. The Supreme 
Court held that the statutory notice by publication and by mail to 
the owner of record alone did not meet the requirements of due 
process. See 462 U.S. at 800. Such notice by itself it not 
reasonably calculated to reach interested parties. The Court went 
on to state: 
Notice by mail or other means as certain to 
ensure actual notice is a minimum 
constitutional pre-condition to a proceeding 
which will adversely affect the liberty or 
property interests of any party. . .if its 
name and address are reasonably ascertainable. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
In this case, the minimum constitutional pre-condition to the 
validity of the final tax sale, which adversely affected FDC's 
property interests, was not met. FDC was never served by mail or 
other means as certain to ensure actual notice even though FDC's 
name and address were reasonably ascertainable from the recorded 
Notice of Contract. That defect in the notice given of the tax 
sale deprived FDC of its interests without due process of law. See 
also Fivas v. Petersen, supra, 300 P.2d at 634-40. The lower court 
was therefore correct in declaring the tax sale, the tax deed to 
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Bitner and Bitner's subsequent purported conveyance to Miles 
invalid. 
Mennonite Board of Missions is on all fours with this case, 
and Miles1 attempted distinction is meritless. Miles argues that 
the mortgagee in Mennonite Board of Missions "was at the mercy of 
the property owner to pay the taxes on the property," and that the 
owner's failure to pay the taxes entitled the mortgagee, which 
otherwise "would not be aware of any arrearage or tax sales," to 
personal or mailed notice. Miles1 brief at 18-19. Here, Miles 
contends that FDC was responsible to pay taxes on the property, and 
that FDC's failure to do so, not the failure of any third party, 
caused the property to be sold at the tax sale. 
Miles' attempted distinction ignores the holding of Mennonite 
Board of Missions. Apparently, in response to an argument that the 
mortgagee in that case should have taken steps to determine whether 
property taxes were delinquent and a tax sale pending, the Court 
said: 
Personal service or mailed notice is required 
even though sophisticated creditors have means 
at their disposal to discover whether property 
taxes have not been paid and whether tax sale 
proceedings are therefore likely to be 
initiated. In the first place, a mortgage 
need not involve a complex commercial 
transaction among knowledgeable parties, and 
it may well be the least sophisticated 
creditor whose security interest is threatened 
by a tax sale. More importantly, a party's 
ability to take steps to safeguard its 
interests does not relieve the State of its 
constitutional obligation. It is true that 
particularly extensive efforts to provide 
notice may often be required when the State is 
aware of a party's inexperience or 
incompetence. . . . But it does not follow 
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that the State may forgo [sic] even the 
relatively modest administrative burden of 
providing notice by mail to parties who are 
particularly resourceful. 
462 U.S. at 799-800 (citations and footnote omitted; emphasis 
added). Therefore, the constitutional pre-condition of adequate 
notice to FDC, a recorded interest holder, cannot be foregone 
merely because FDC allegedly did not take sufficient steps to 
protect its own interest in the property. Miles' position 
impermissibly attempts to shift the burden to the taxpayer to 
ascertain whether and when a final tax sale will be held. See 
Fivas v. Petersen# supra, 300 P.2d at 637. 
Further, as pointed out above, FDC did take steps to safeguard 
its interest in the property by recording the Notice of Contract. 
That was sufficient to entitle FDC to personal or mailed notice of 
the tax sale under the Utah tax sale statutes as well as Mennonite 
Board of Missions and Mullane. And FDC did attempt to pay taxes on 
the property, for which it had not been assessed, but without 
success. The failure to send notice here was not FDC's, but Summit 
County's; therefore, Miles' contention that Mennonite Board of 
Missions is distinguishable because it involved the failure of a 
third party, rather than the party entitled to notice, must fail. 
Importantly, Bitner, Miles' immediate predecessor in interest, 
was also responsible for the County's failure to apprise FDC of the 
tax sale. For five years after Bitner had conveyed the property to 
Burkinshaw, Bitner continued to receive tax assessment notices (R. 
195-99). The notices Bitner received for at least three of those 
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years, 1981 to 1983, state: "If property has been sold, please 
forward to new owner11 (R. 197-99). 
Bitner evidently knew that FDC was purchasing the property 
under a real estate contract because Bitner and his wife executed 
a new quit claim deed to Burkinshaw on September 13, 1979. That 
was the same day the UREC was executed, nearly a year after Bitner 
had originally quitclaimed the property to Burkinshaw. Both the 
new quitclaim deed and FDC's Notice of Contract were recorded five 
days later at the request of Granite Title Company (see R. 182, 
217). The Court may reasonably infer that Granite Title handled 
FDC's purchase of the property from Burkinshaw, and that Granite 
Title required Bitner to execute the new quitclaim deed in order to 
establish in the record the chain of title from Bitner to FDC. 
Bitner*s failure to forward the tax assessment notices or 
notice of tax sale to FDC, or even to alert Summit County that he 
no longer had any interest in the property, is inexcusable. In 
light of FDCfs unsuccessful attempt to obtain notice of tax 
assessments from Summit County, FDC was "at the mercy" of Bitner, 
who chose not to inform FDC or Summit County of the County's 
mistake. These facts emphasize that Mennonite Board of Missions is 
controlling here, and Miles' attempted distinction of the case is 
meaningless.8 Consequently, the Court should follow that case in 
With respect to the constitutional sufficiently of notice 
to FDC, Miles again confuses the respective requirements for notice 
that taxes are due and notice that the property will be sold to 
satisfy delinquent taxes. She claims that FDC had notice that 
taxes would be assessed on the property, relying on, among other 
things, provisions in the UREC regarding payment of taxes and a 
reference to the assessment of taxes in the title insurance policy 
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affirming the lower court's ruling that constitutionally inadequate 
notice rendered the tax sale invalid. 
2. Fairness Requires That Plaintiff FDC Should 
Not Be Deprived of Its Property Interest 
Without Due Process of Law in Favor of Pe-
dant Miles and Bitner/ Her Predecessor in 
Interest, Who Were Not Bona Fide Purchasers 
For Value. 
As set forth above, FDC was deprived of its due process rights 
because it did not receive notice of the tax sale at which its 
property was sold. Bitner knew that FDC owned the property, or at 
the very least that he no longer owned the property, and yet he 
never informed FDC or Summit County that he was erroneously 
continuing to receive tax assessment notices. Rather, he waited 
until the final tax sale, of which he received notice by certified 
mail, and then purchased the property for a small percentage of its 
value. Shortly thereafter he quitclaimed the property to Miles. 
In Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982), this Court 
held that record owners of property could not strengthen their 
title as against subsequent transferees by paying at a tax sale the 
taxes they were obligated, but had failed, to pay previously. The 
Court placed the burden on record owners who transfer their 
interests in property "to make appropriate arrangements for payment 
by [their transferees].f! ^d. at 977. 
issued by Granite Title Company. But such purported notice is 
irrelevant to whether Summit County discharged its constitutional 
obligation to advise FDC that the property would be sold to satisfy 
back taxes. See Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, supra, 462 
U.S. at 800. A recorded interest holder's knowledge that tax 
payments are delinquent is fundamentally different from knowledge 
that a tax sale, where those property interests will be affected, 
is pending. See id. 
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D. The Purported Factual Issues Raised By Miles 
On Appeal Do Not Defeat FDC's Entitlement to 
Summary Judgment. 
As set forth above, this Court's review of the lower court's 
decision must be confined to the facts before that court as 
contained in the record below. An appellant who fails or chooses 
not to controvert facts set forth by way of affidavit in connection 
with a motion for summary judgment cannot on appeal reach outside 
the record to conjure up issues of fact that were never raised 
below. See Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., supra. 
Miles impermissibly attempts to contrive three such purported 
factual issues, and in so doing seeks the Court's indulgence in 
going beyond the ordinary scope of its review. First, Miles claims 
that a factual issue exists as to whether FDC received adequate 
notice of the final tax sale.9 However, it is undisputed that FDC 
was an interest holder of record and that it never received notice 
by mail or personal service of the pending tax sale. Under the 
authorities cited above, those uncontroverted facts are sufficient 
to establish the invalidity of the final tax sale as a matter of 
Miles asserts that language contained in the UREC and the 
title insurance policy (which was not part of the record below) 
gave FDC adequate notice that taxes would be assessed on the 
property and that the property eventually would be sold for 
delinquent taxes. As established above, such "notice" is not 
equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending, for which notice 
by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a 
minimum constitutional requirement. Mennonite Board of Missions v. 
Adams, supra, 462 U.S. at 800. Therefore, Miles' contention that 
FDC should have been aware that the property would be sold at some 
future date if FDC did not pay the taxes on the property (for which 
it was never assessed) is entirely irrelevant and does not present 
a genuine issue of material fact. 
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constitutional and statute*",1 ' •/ *-. See Mennonite Board of _ Missions 
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c h a l l e n g e d be low t h e a f f i d a v i t of FDC's p r e s i d e n t s t a t i n g t h a t 
Summit County t o l d FDC i II c o u l d n o t a l l o c a t e t a x e s t o t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l p a r c e l FDC was p u r c h a s i n g . Summit County c h o s e n o t t o 
r e s i s t FDC's m o t i o n f o r p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t . 
itself to determine whether it identifies property with reasonable 
certainty). 
A comparison of the legal descriptions contained in FDC's 
recorded Notice of Contract (R. 182), the tax assessment notices 
and notice of final tax sale (see R. 195-200, 220) and the tax deed 
to Bitner (R. 210) reveals that, except for an easement that is not 
pertinent here, the descriptions are identical. Thus, even if 
an issue as to the adequacy of the legal description in FDC's 
Notice of Contract had been raised below, the lower court correctly 
could have concluded, as a matter of law, that FDC's interest was 
sufficiently recorded so as to entitle it to notice by mail of the 
final tax sale.12 
For these reasons, even when the Court views the facts in the 
light most favorable to Miles, there still exists no genuine issue 
Miles relies on Summit County's initial statement that the 
reference in FDC's Notice of Contract to "Lot 5, Stagecoach Estates 
Plat 'C'lf was indefinite (see Miles' brief at 20). That statement, 
however, was incorrect. Summit County had used the same reference 
in its tax assessment notices and the tax deed to Bitner (R. 195-
200, 210, 220). The same is true of the metes and bounds 
description in FDC's Notice of Contract. However "vague and 
indefinite" the description in FDC's Notice of Contract may be, it 
is the same description used in the tax assessment notices, notice 
of final tax sale and tax deed. Significantly, Summit County did 
not oppose FDC's motion for partial summary judgment. 
As a parting shot, Miles alludes to the "length of time 
that elapsed prior to bringing this action" (Miles brief at 22). 
Her statement is not only completely irrelevant to this appeal 
since she did not raise it below as an issue of material fact, it 
is also untrue. Miles makes an unsupported assertion that FDC made 
no attempt to contact her until it filed this lawsuit in 1988. 
However, in 1987 immediately after FDC learned that Miles was 
asserting possessory rights to the subject property, FDC made a 
written demand that she vacate the property. She failed to do so, 
and FDC filed this lawsuit several months later (See R. 6). 
40 
of materia] fart nrpcludinq summary judgment. The lower courtfs 
2entr; summa. udgment should be affirmed. 
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13 Consequently j Hi Inn. iJid not receive valid title iu the 
property and did not convey valid title to Miles, Their; interests, 
if any, are inferior to FDC's. See Dillman v. Fosterf supra, 656 
P.2d at 978-79. The "paramount" tax title Miles claims, citing 
Hansen v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 46 P.2d 4,;; ,19 35), only vests when 
a valid tax title is purchased. See Dillman v. Foster, supra, 656 
P.2d at 978-79. 
of justice and fair play, the Court should affirm in all respects 
the lower court's judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of July, 1990. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
^y^ 
Rodney G. Snow // 
Stephen B. Doxey ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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59-10-64. Sales by county.—(1) Upon receiving the
 ;s .*.- -
from the county treasurer, the county auditor shall immediately advertise 
for sale during the month of May all real estate sold to the county at 
preliminary sale and not previously redeemed or sold at private sale as 
provided in section 59-10-37 and upon which the period of redemption 
expired upon March thirty-first next preceding. 
Notice of sale shall be published in a newspaper published in the 
county and having general circulation therein, four tira.es, once in each 
of four successive weeks immediately preceding the date of sale, or if 
no such newspaper is published in the county, by posting such notice 
in five public places in the county, as determined by the auditor, at least 
twenty-five and no more than thirty days prior to the date of sale. Notice 
of sale shall also be sent to the last known recorded owner at his last 
known address by registered mail. 
59-2-1351. Sales by county — Notice of final May tax sale 
- Tax deed — Entries on record. 
(1) Upon receiving the Final May Tax Sale Listing from the county trea-
surer, the county auditor shall immediately advertise for sale during the 
month of May all real estate sold to the county at preliminary sale and not 
previously redeemed and upon which the period of redemption is expiring in 
the nearest forthcoming Final May Tax Sale. 
(2) Notice of final tax sale shall be published four times in a newspaper 
published and having general circulation in the county, once in each of four 
successive weeks immediately preceding the date of sale. If no newspaper is 
published in the county, the notice shall be posted in five public places in the 
county, as determined by the auditor, at least 25 but no more than 30 days 
prior to the date of sale. Notice of sale shall also be sent by certified mail to 
the last known recorded owner and all other recorded lienholders, according to 
the deed, as of the preceding March 31, at their last-known address. In the 
case of the sale of the total parcel of property, unrecorded or unnotified lien-
holders may assert their liens against unclaimed property to the extent that 
money is available to satisfy the liens. 
